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  1. #1

    Articles related to International Relations

    What Causes Wars? A Theoretical View. Realism, Liberalism and Marxism.
    What causes wars?

    War is a state of armed conflict between different countries or different groups within a country. War can take on many forms including world, inter-state, intra-state or revolutionary. In order to assess the causes of wars, a theoretical approach is useful to broaden our understanding and perspective on the issue.

    A realist theoretical approach is probably the most dominant in the area of international relations. Realism can be divided into three broad types; classical, modern and neo-realism, however all share a number of core principles. The classical realist perspective is most commonly associated with the writings of Thucydides (460-400BC), Machiavelli (1469-1527) and Hobbes (1588-1679). Each placed great emphasis on the primacy of the state but also juxtaposed the suggested ‘human nature’ of egoism, selfishness and greed onto the character of the state. For Machiavelli in particular, morals and ethics had no place in politics and as he stated, “in politics we must act as if all men are wicked and that they will always give vent to the malignity that is their minds when opportunity offers” (Cited in Donnelly, 2009, p.32). At the core of the classical realist perspective is the three concepts of statism, survival and self-help. These concepts were core to the later writings of modern realists such as Waltz and Carr, often termed structural realists, who although acknowledging the concept of a human nature in statecraft, placed greater emphasis on the anarchic nature of the international system which “fosters fear, jealousy, suspicion and insecurity” amongst states(Dunne and Schmidt, 2008, pp.100-103). For modern realists states are the primary actors, acting rationally and with security and the maximisation of power a necessary goal for each state under a system of anarchy. These views on the character of states and their motivations in an anarchic international system provide us with the realist perspective on the causes of war.
    Many realists subscribe to the political conception of war from Clausewitz, who, writing in ‘On War’ in 1831, suggested that war is a controlled and rational act, and “a continuation of political activity by other means” (Cited in Brown and Ainley, 2009, p.115). What Clausewitz was suggesting is that if states see war as a necessary step to further their power or interests, they will use it as a rational political tool. Modern realists such as Waltz have further developed this concept of the cause of war and added to it. Writing in ‘Man, the State and War’, Waltz sets out three interrelated images of the causes of war. Firstly, and in line with classical realist thought, war has its roots in flawed human nature. This view suggests that “the evilness of men, or their improper behaviour, leads to war” (Waltz, 2001, p.39). For the second image, Waltz suggests that the internal organisation of the state unit is crucial in understanding its propensity towards war. This image has two tenets in that in order to ensure survival from internal strife or civil war, states must promote a homogenous unified entity. To foster this type of unified entity, the state seeks war against others to prevent internal self-destruction. Finally, Waltz’s third image emphasises international anarchy and suggests that as states have interests that clash with the interests of others, for example over scarce resources, with no overarching authority to restrain them “a state will use force to attain its goals if, after assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than it values the pleasures of peace” (Waltz, 2001, p.160). The views of Waltz in many ways encompass the realist view on what causes wars. The liberalist perspective provides an alternative view.
    Liberalism is a theory that emerged out the European enlightenment period and is most commonly associated with the writings of Locke, Bentham and Kant. Kant in particular, in seeking to prescribe a route out of what he called “the lawless state of savagery” that existed in international relations, proposed a theory of “perpetual peace”. The route for Kant’s perpetual peace involved three core tenets which are republican constitutionalism, a federation of free states and a universal humanity (Kant, cited in Dunne, 2008, p.112). Kant argued that a federation of free states would be pacific, and would not war with each other. This theory was developed further by Doyle in his ‘democratic peace’ thesis in 1986, and this will explored further in a moment. Liberalism as a theory has a number of core ideals including “scientific rationality, freedom and the inevitability of human progress ... individual rights, constitutionalism, democracy ... and argues that market capitalism best promotes the welfare of all” (Burchill, 2009, p.57). Liberalism, like realism, sees states as being characterised by a human nature but in contrast to realism it sees human nature in a positive light. In this regard, liberalism views states from the inside out and seeks to project a positive human nature onto states. By taking this path, Dunne suggests that “the historical project of Liberalism is the domestication of the international” (2008, p110). However, as a normative theory that seeks to promote peace, liberalism also provides various accounts on the causes of wars.
    As suggested earlier, Doyle, writing in 1986 developed further Kant’s theory of perpetual peace with his own democratic peace theory. In this, Doyle pointed out that “democracies were peaceful, but only with one another. States that were both liberal and representative would maintain peace with one another, but not reliably with other non-liberal, non-representative states” (Doyle, 1986). So, for Doyle, the problem of undemocratic regimes is the cause of war. This view has at times been used to justify intervention into the affairs of nondemocratic countries. However, this view seems to go against the core value non-intervention and freedom contained in liberalism Others from a liberalist tradition see the causes of war rooted in the problem of imperialism or the breakdown of the balance or power system, with this only remedied by cooperation and mutually beneficial commerce (Dunne, 2008, p.110). Others such as Schumpeter saw war as the result of the aggressive urges of groups of unrepresentative elite rulers (Burchill, 2009, p.61). What these different views from within liberalism show is that it fails to provide a coherent and agreed upon explanation of the causes of wars like a realist, and also like a Marxist analysis do.
    Marxism provides us with an altogether different analysis of what causes wars, although in some ways both realism and liberalism use a similar analysis. This idea of similarities will be developed in the penultimate paragraph. Marxism as a theory comes from the writings of Karl Marx during the nineteenth century, but has been further developed by others such as Lenin. Marx’s core analysis of the world saw economic development as the “motor of history” (Hobden and Wyn Jones, 2008, p.146). He suggested that the tension that economic development created between the owners of the means of production (The Bourgeoisie) and the working class (The Proletariat) was expressed as class conflict. This tension, Marx argued, would lead to revolutionary movements which would overthrow the capitalist system and create socialism, and the eventual withering away of the state leading to pure communism (Marx and Engels, 2008). Although Marx himself did not put forward an in-depth analysis of international relations, his analysis of the capitalist system and class conflict have been taken up by others such as Lenin, to provide a theory of world politics. It is Lenin’s theory of ‘imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism’, as well as ‘world-system theory’ which provide a Marxist analysis of the causes of wars.
    According to Marxist theory, the capitalist system produces class conflict, which in turn provides the fuel for revolutionary movements and popular uprisings by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. This theory has been proved correct by events such as the October Revolution in Russia in 1917. One of the chief architects of the October Revolution, Lenin, wrote his theory of imperialism before those events. Lenin’s adaption of Marx’s ideas provided an analysis of what Lenin described as “monopoly capitalism”. In his theory Lenin suggested that as capitalism developed as a system, monopoly capitalism was the highest stage of it development. According to Lenin, “imperialism is capitalism when “the formation of international capitalist monopolies will share the world among themselves and the territorial division of the whole world among the greatest capitalist powers is completed” (Lenin, 1996). In this way Lenin is suggesting that capitalist powers will cause wars with weaker nations to increase their holding of monopoly capital. As capitalism develops, its natural progression is for core capitalist nations to exploit those on the periphery through imperialist wars in search of new markets and resources. Lenin’s theory provided the origins of ‘world systems theory’ (Hobden and Wyn Jones, 2008, P.147). World systems theory, developed by Immanuel Wallerstein, outlines a world in which a core of developed capitalist countries exploits both a semi-periphery of developing, and a periphery of less developed countries. Under this system, imperialist wars are not only likely but inevitable, as the exploitative relationship occurs between these three zones.
    The three theories outlined above are the dominant theories of International Relations. Each provides a different perspective on how international politics functions and on what are the causes of wars. From the realist perspective, war has a number of different but also interrelated causes. These include a flawed and aggressive human nature in states, the internal organisation of states and the anarchic nature of the international system creating a race for power, survival and security. The liberal perspective takes a different standpoint and Doyle’s democratic peace theory seriously questions the realist view “that the anarchic nature of the international system means states are trapped in a struggle for power and security” (Linklater, 1993, cited in Burchill, 2009, pp.58-59). While liberals agree that the anarchic system exists, they would suggest it is not the prime reason for wars. Liberalism also contains in inherent contradiction in that it promotes freedom in the economic and social sphere domestically, whilst promoting interventionist strategies in the in international arena to promote trade liberalisation and democracy. A Marxist analysis shares similarities with both the realist and liberalist perspectives. In line with realists, Marxists would agree that the structure of the international system, where capitalist democracies seek to expand their power and security through furthering their national interests, is the cause of war. Also, Marxists would agree with the proposal from some liberals that imperialism is the ultimate cause of wars. Where the Marxist and in particular the Leninist theory provides a more comprehensive analysis is that it points out that it is the capitalist system that pushes states towards a grab for power and resources. It also exposes the underlying reason for war that both realism and liberalism fail to address. Both of these other theories neglect to fully analyse the effect of the international economic system and its effects on the behaviour of states. In this sense, a Marxist analysis provides a more comprehensive explanation of the causes of wars.
    In conclusion, to answer the question of what causes wars, this essay has used the three theoretical perspectives of realism, liberalism and Marxism. The essay provided an outline of each theory before giving each theory’s explanation for the causes of wars. After this the essay compared and contrasted each theory’s explanation for the causes of wars and this analysis led to the conclusion that while there are varying and diverse explanations for the causes of wars, the Marxist analysis provides the best analysis of the underlying causes of wars. That analysis suggests that it is the capitalist economic system of the world that fuels conflict and war.

    Source: http://weonlywanttheearth.blogspot.c...ical-view.html
    "Moral Courage is Higher and Rarer Virtue"

  2. #2
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    Daesh: the postmodern non-state

    Daesh: the postmodern non-state

    Mosharraf Zaidi
    Wednesday, July 08, 2015

    There is one aspect of the threat of non-state actors like Daesh (or Isil, or Isis) that terrifies the imagination above all others. To beat the modern state, Daesh does not need to beat the modern state at being a modern state.

    Everybody knows that entities like Da’esh have no chance of winning a conventional conflict against coherent and powerful state structures like the Egyptian Army or the Indonesian Navy or the Pakistani Air Force. Daesh knows this too. That is why it doesn’t get into the conventional war racket to begin with. It plays the unconventional game. To win, entities like Daesh simply need to eke out an existence that is parallel to the traditional state’s existence. In other words, the modern state, unless it enjoys absolute sovereignty across absolutely all of its territory, in all realms possible, cannot win any fight that it enters. Or put even more simply, the modern state cannot beat the postmodern medieval non-state – because they aren’t playing on the same battlefield. Daesh will beat the modern state at the game that is being played, because while Daesh is playing and winning that game, the modern state is still stuck in Westphalia, the Treaty of Versailles and the inequities of post cold-war uni-polarity of global affairs.

    On Monday evening, US President Barack Obama offered an optimistic profile of the sixty-nation coalition that he believes is making progress in “the fight against Isil”, but for once, his critics are absolutely right. As senior US Senator John McCain says, what the United States and its allies are doing, is “disconnected from any coherent strategy to defeat Isil”.

    The problem is that there cannot be and will not be a single coherent strategy that can defeat entities like Isil or Daesh because this is a fight between vastly different entities. The modern state, or any coalition of modern states, or all the modern states put together, have no chance of defeating a postmodern, medieval non-state. Conversely, the state will never truly or fully lose to the non-state, unless that state has already collapsed.

    The only countries in which Daesh has real potency are countries where large swathes of territory are no longer shaped by the rules that govern a modern state: Libya, Syria and Iraq. Yet this is no reason for complacency in countries like Indonesia, Egypt or Pakistan. Daesh and what it represents are existential threats to all Muslims societies for the very reason that it cannot territorially overrun these countries on its own. It is the fissiparous, self-defeating dysfunction of Muslim-majority countries that is the biggest ally of Daesh.

    Imagine an armoured division full of tanks, attack helicopters and gunships, highly sophisticated, encrypted signals units, heavy artillery and armoured personnel carriers trying to fight a ground war against a virus that can be contracted by breathing. Most armies are going to lose that fight, without any shots being fired. Trying to conceive of a victory over Daesh or any permutation thereof is like trying to imagine this vaunted armoured division of our imagination beating the virus in the air. You can’t buy enough ammunition to guarantee victory.

    Pakistan has had a strange and complex theoretical and operational set of relationships with non-state actors. Once upon a time, the state was a proliferator of non-state actors. Given the constraints of resources and capacity that Pakistan faced from its very conception, this was an understandable tactic. Over time, the tactic became a strategy, and over time, the strategy morphed into a national framework. Today, a pervasive contempt for the very idea of the state permeates every level of state and society – with an impact that is difficult to fully surmise.

    On the one hand, the constraints and limitations of the state have given rise to an innovation economy that keeps finding ways to do things outside the scope of what is normally defined as regular state behaviour. On the other, the fact that our state and society have become accustomed to using non-state actors to do the work that states should be doing has produced dangerous and unsustainable pressures on the peripheries of Pakistan – one example of this is our enduring relationships with entities like the Haqqani Network, a prime candidate if there ever was one, to adopt or morph into Daesh or Daesh-Light.

    Our political discourse is a strange but extremely willing bedfellow of the non-state-isation of Pakistan. Both those inside the halls of power and those outside it contribute to the creeping and insidious delegitimisation of the state with almost everything that they do. Angry members of the opposition tear away at already fragile state organisations and institutions for their limited competence, not realising that their very existence is a miracle, and that without sustained nurturing, those entities are at the precipice of collapse. No better example of this exists than the Election Commission of Pakistan. Meanwhile, those within government, like the prime minister, ache for solutions to problems, no matter where they come from, or who pays for them.

    Invariably, because of the administrative structures of the state, no solutions are forthcoming from within the state (except for the very rare instances in which disruption has been cultivated, such as at places like the Punjab IT Board, or Nadra). This means that more and more and more, the state is turning to non-state entities and actors to figure out how to do the business of the state. At one level, this is a remarkable sign of openness to learn and willingness to get things done. At another, it is a terrifying indicator of how far deep our malaise is. If we don’t have confidence in the state’s problem solving and work-doing ability any more, what are we doing sustaining the massive state infrastructure that we sustain?

    The terrifying answer of course is that we are slaves to momentum and inertia. There is an inevitable intersection we are headed towards where the traditional modern state will crash into the non-traditional, postmodern non-state. The state cannot emerge from the pile up as the victor because the shape and form of what it is about to crash into is totally different. As the Pakistani scholar Moeed Yusuf keeps warning, the complexity of the challenge of entities like Daesh is that as long as you have a single citizen that hesitates in choosing the Islamic Republic over the ‘Khilafat’, you have a clear and present existential threat to the state, or in this case, our Islamic Republic. How do you then win against Daesh?

    For too many people working on countering violent extremism, the answer is in the question: “you have to counter the ideology of violent extremism”. This is a self-defeating loop that we have now been running around in, like gerbils on a hamster wheel. Round and round and round we go. Since at least 9/11. If latter-day post Al-Qaeda terrorists like Saad Aziz, or the Nigerian underwear bomber, or other lone-wolves, were amenable to alternative ideologies, they would have found them on the internet and adopted them. Violent extremists are not simply a product of chat rooms, and madressah sermons. They are products of local and global narratives that produce a brazen contempt for the traditional modern state and its paraphernalia.

    This contempt is not hard to find in modern Muslim societies, from Turkey, to Indonesia, from Tanzania to Tajikistan. People hate the things that have come to symbolise the modern state: slow and inefficient processes, cold and heartless outcomes. Bureaucracies that exist to serve themselves and their cadres before they serve the people. Armies that compete with civilians for influence and power. Taps that serve water-borne diseases. Schools that extinguish the light in children’s eyes. Hospitals that proliferate pain and misery. Courts that dole out injustice. Policemen that serve and protect only the rich and the famous.

    The contempt people have for the state is not unfounded. It is real and it has long-term potency. Fighting and beating non-traditional, postmodern medieval non-states like Daesh will require a departure from the behaviour profile of the traditional modern state. It will require the reimagining of the modern state altogether. It doesn’t feel like we’re ready.

    Published in The News

  3. #3

    A game-changing deal

    A game-changing deal

    BY I. A . R E H M A N | 7/23/2015

    WHILE the agreement between P5+1 and Iran over the latter`s nuclear programme has rightly been hailed as the beginning of a new phase in international relations, its implications for Middle Eastern politics are truly momentous and hence of special interest to Pakistan.

    After making up with China many years ago and shaking hands with Cuba recently, the United States has allowed pragmatism to persuade it to embrace a country it had kept on its enemy list for more than three decades. At the same time, Iran has recognised its interest in closing the chapter of its high intensity hostility towards Western countries, the US in particular.

    Iran is apparently the principal beneficiary of the deal as it promises it the revival of its economy and an increase in its stature as a regional power.

    However, much will depend upon the way the agreement is implemented. Apprehensions of a radical shift in the balance of power in the Middle East are perhaps the reason that the deal has attracted some adverse comments too. The anxieties of critics, however, can easily be understood.

    Israel`s loud protest means no more than a pro forma reaction and a plea for greater aid from the US. It has no reason to doubt US determination to provide it with effective protection. The US defence secretary has already declared that the accord does not preclude military action against Iran.

    Saudi Arabia has real worries. The kingdom finds itself surrounded by pockets of Iranian influence in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, to say nothing of Hezbollah`s presence in Lebanon. This is the end of King Faisal`s dream of countering Nasserite Arab nationalism and the secular politics of the Baath party in the Syria-Iraq region with what was called Islamic nationalism or what Robert Fisk has aptly described as Sunni dominance. The only option before the kingdom is to grow out of the tribal phase and stop mixing belief with politics.

    More relevant than external criticism are the voices of dissent in Iran itself. Its foremost religious authority, Ayatollah Khamenei, hardly appeared to favour the deal as it signified, in his view, abandonment of his country`s opposition to US policies. The official Iranian response has been reaffirmation of support to its friends across the Near East.

    The confrontation between President Rouhani and his critics is unlikely to end soon. At the heart of the disagreement lies the belief that the Muslims have cherished throughout the centuries of their subjugation by the West that their natural prowess as fighters will enable them to vanquish any rival, no matter how superior in number and arms it may be. The price the Muslim world has paid for nourishing this improbable myth is colossal.

    Israel today occupies an area much larger than what it had at the time of its creation, thanks to the Arab regimes` attempts to destroy it with their passion alone. Pakistan made a similar mistake by trying to take Kashmir by force. The wars of 1965 and 1971 played a large part in making UN resolutions on the dispute with India redundant in the eyes of the world.

    This is not to suggest that all Muslim states should start hobnobbing with Israel or that Pakistan should give up the cause of the Kashmiri people. The only point one wishes to make is that the use of force in the cause of Palestine or Kashmir must be ruled out in favour of peaceful strategies of settlement of these issues in an indeterminable future, on the strength of the enhanced economic strength and political clout the Muslim peoples are capable of acquiring if they stop wasting their resources on useless armaments.

    Those against the deal on the grounds that Iran will not be able to manufacture nuclear weapons for a decade, or perhaps longer, need to realise that nuclear weapons make their owners less secure and not more. They may look at the huge cost Pakistan has paid for gate-crashing into the nuclear powers` club. Islamabad has to spend a good bit of time offering assurances that Pakistani nukes are in safe and responsible hands. Nobody realises the negation of such rhetoric by statements, such as the one attributed to the country`s defence minister, to the effect that Pakistan`s nuclear devices are not mere showcase decorations.

    The reality that both Pakistan and Iran, and India too, must accept is that the security cover that nuclear bombs are supposed to provide is illusory.

    Far better security can be achieved by realising the developing world`s economic potential, by offering its populations a higher stake in patriotism, and by cementing friendly relations among the Third World countries. Looked at from this point of view Iran loses nothing by the Vienna deal.

    Quite a few Pakistani observers have gleefully hailed the nuclear accord as they see enhanced prospects for gainful cooperation with Iran. Islamabad will do well to control its emotions, for the change in the Middle East politics presents it with quite a few challenges. That Iran has become a key player in the region is not debatable but the way it chooses to play its trumps will have to be watched as closely as the Saudi moves to face the situation.

    The one thing Islamabad cannot afford to do is to judge its friendship with Iran and Saudi Arabia by their ties with India, as both are likely to warm up to New Delhi. Pakistan will need diplomacy of the highest calibre to keep its feet in both the Iranian and Saudi boats. It must not get involved with the religious rift between two of its closest friends. The ideal of being able to broker peace between them is much too tempting but Pakistan has done little to qualify for this august role.

    Published in Dawn

  4. #4
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    Tensions over Chinese role

    Tensions over Chinese role

    WORLD attention is understandably focused on the violence in the Middle East but it is also important to take a closer look at President Barack Obama’s re-engagement with Asia and the Sino-American jostling for power and influence in the region.

    America’s military presence looms large over Asia, reassuring many who worry about China’s rising military expenditure and new assertiveness over territorial claims in the South and East China Seas.

    Across Asia there is a strong consensus that the US ‘pivot’ to Asia announced last year is designed to contain a rising China.

    Washington insists its new policy is not related to China’s growing power or a permanent return to military bases of the past, but it has increased its military presence in the Philippines and other areas near vital sea lanes in the South China Sea.

    Most Asians welcome America’s renewed interest — and increased military presence — in the region. But many are also unwilling to get entangled in a dangerous tug-of-war between the world’s two most important powers.

    First of all, good relations between the world’s first and second largest economies are critically important for Asian stability as well as global peace. Second, while they may like America’s warm military embrace, most Asian countries depend hugely on China for markets, especially for their commodity exports and for investments.

    Third, while willing to discuss, consult and cooperate with their partners, the 10 countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) want to ensure their ‘centrality’ in the region.

    In other words, America, China, Russia and even Europe are welcome to attend meetings and sign up for trade pacts. But it is Asean that intends to stay in the driving seat, controlling the region’s future direction.

    For evidence of the new power play in Asia, look no further than President Obama’s much-publicised visit to Myanmar and the confusion and bad blood on show at the Asean and East Asia summit meetings just held in Cambodia.

    The US leader’s trip was rightly viewed in the region as a validation of Asia’s strategic importance. But Obama also came quickly face-to-face with the tough realities of what it will take to counter China’s influence in the region.

    Establishing a bigger, more influential presence in the Asia-Pacific region has long been an Obama objective, a goal that analysts say is driven by 21st-century geopolitical considerations and by the Hawaiian-born president’s own self-identity as the first Pacific president.
    Just by making the trip — and by making it his first after his re-election — Obama made a point about the importance the US attaches to the region. He was greeted by large crowds chanting his name in Thailand and in Myanmar. But the US leader received a more muted reception in neighbouring Cambodia, a staunch ally of China.

    The US president’s participation in the annual summit of Southeast Asian leaders in Phnom Penh and the larger East Asia Summit were another strong indication of US intentions to play a bigger role in the region.

    But it was not all plain sailing for America. Underlining their determination to steer the future of the region, Asean leaders launched a proposal for a new trade bloc, to be known as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) which is seen as a rival to a US trade initiative to establish an 11-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which excludes China.

    Not surprisingly, China has voiced strong support for the RCEP initiative which would include Asean countries plus six nations that have free-trade agreements with the association: Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. The TPP, meanwhile, is an economic element in US policy to contain China.

    But it was not easy for China either. Significantly China also came in for its share of grilling over its hard-line stance in disputes with four Southeast Asian countries over ownership of islands in the South China Sea. China’s sovereignty claims over the stretch of water off its south coast and to the east of mainland Southeast Asia set it directly against US allies Vietnam and the Philippines, while Brunei, Taiwan and Malaysia also lay claim to parts.

    Cambodia, the host of the summits, insisted at one point that its members, by consensus, did not want the South China Sea issue to be “internationalised” — meaning that the US and other countries with interests in the security of the sea, one of the world’s busiest trade routes, would have no say in the rules pertaining to the body of water.

    This was fiercely opposed by the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia and Vietnam. Asean has now said it wants to soon start formal talks with China on a code of conduct that would reduce the risk of conflict over the sea. China has balked at such urgency, however.

    Obama urged Asian leaders to reduce tensions in the South China Sea and other disputed territory, but stopped short of firmly backing allies Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam in their disputes with China. Possibly not wanting to further antagonise China in the midst of its once-in-a-generation leadership change, he steered clear of the kind of tough public rhetoric he used against Beijing during his last Asia tour a year ago.

    At stake is control over what are believed to be significant reserves of oil and gas. Estimates for proven and undiscovered oil reserves in the entire sea range from 28 billion to as high as 213 billion barrels of oil, according to the US Energy Information Administration.

    The strains within Asean that were apparent in Cambodia illustrate the difficulty of forging a Southeast Asian consensus over how to deal with an increasingly assertive China. They also showcase how — if left unchecked — Sino-American rivalries risk escalating tensions and divisions in the region.

    Published in Dawn



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